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Abstract
Background: Many healthcare organizations have developed disclosure policies for large-scale adverse events,
including the Veterans Health Administration (VA). This study evaluated VA’s national large-scale disclosure policy
and identifies gaps and successes in its implementation.
Methods: Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with leaders, hospital employees, and patients at
nine sites to elicit their perceptions of recent large-scale adverse events notifications and the national disclosure
policy. Data were coded using the constructs of the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR).
Results: We conducted 97 interviews. Insights included how to handle the communication of large-scale
disclosures through multiple levels of a large healthcare organization and manage ongoing communications about
the event with employees. Of the 5 CFIR constructs and 26 sub-constructs assessed, seven were prominent in
interviews. Leaders and employees specifically mentioned key problem areas involving 1) networks and
communications during disclosure, 2) organizational culture, 3) engagement of external change agents during
disclosure, and 4) a need for reflecting on and evaluating the policy implementation and disclosure itself. Patients
shared 5) preferences for personal outreach by phone in place of the current use of certified letters. All interviewees
discussed 6) issues with execution and 7) costs of the disclosure.
Conclusions: CFIR analysis reveals key problem areas that need to be addresses during disclosure, including: timely
communication patterns throughout the organization, establishing a supportive culture prior to implementation,
using patient-approved, effective communications strategies during disclosures; providing follow-up support for
employees and patients, and sharing lessons learned.
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Background
Implementing a national policy for disclosing large-scale
adverse events to patients is a complex process. Large-
scale adverse events are not unusual [1]. This type of
event occurs when a significant number of patients are
affected by a breakdown in care in a healthcare setting
[2]. A common example is when medical equipment,
such as endoscopes, is reprocessed incorrectly between
patient use. Patients are potentially exposed to infectious
diseases such as HIV and viral hepatitis, though the risk
is often very low or uncertain [3]. Healthcare organiza-
tions struggle with whether and how to notify patients
when there is no known disease transmission [4]. Disclo-
sures of these adverse events seek to give patients an
accurate description of the risk, while maintaining their
trust, by communicating both what is known and
unknown about the event [5]. Patients respond best to
full disclosure of adverse events [6]. Some healthcare
organizations like the Veterans Health Administration
(VA) have mandates to notify patients of these events in
an effort to be transparent and maintain trust in
addition to ensuring that each patient involved in the
adverse event is able to take any necessary action for
their health and well-being.
Many healthcare organizations have developed disclos-
ure policies, including the VA, to guide these disclosure
communications [8, 9]. However, much of the adverse
event disclosure research has focused on individual clin-
ical events [1, 7, 10] while large-scale adverse event dis-
closure communications have not been well shared [9].
Patients expect to be notified quickly about adverse
events [7]. However, many healthcare organizations are
unprepared to respond quickly and effectively to large-
scale events. Delays in notification may occur due to the
time it takes to 1) recognize the adverse event, 2) evalu-
ate the scope of the event and the identities of the
individuals exposed and 3) for leadership to decide to
disclose after discussion with subject matter experts and
other stakeholders. The development of an organizational
disclosure policy is the first step in expediting notification.
Some adverse events involve thousands of exposed
patients and coordination of timely review, communica-
tion, and testing can be a daunting task requiring substan-
tial efforts [11, 12]. It is important to evaluate both how
the disclosure policy is communicated to leaders and em-
ployees who will conduct the disclosure communications,
and to also look at the impact of these communications,
both positive and negative, on patients, families and
employees to evaluate the broad impact of such policies.
We report a retrospective, observational study involving
interviews with stakeholders from past large-scale events
to identify key problematic areas that may impact imple-
mentation of this national policy. We sought to identify
barriers and facilitators to this implementation, specifically
among patients, employees, leadership, and other stake-
holders. We also sought to understand whether elements
of the disclosure communication and organizational
culture had an effect on policy implementation.
Methods
Facility selection
In the United States healthcare system where most
insurance is private, VA is the largest integrated health-
care system. The VA, run by the government, operates
approximately 150 hospitals with over 1000 outpatient
sites of care. Each hospital is led by a Facility Director.
At the time this study was conducted, VHA was
organized into 21 regions across the United States and
each region was led by a Network Director. All regions,
hospitals and clinics are expected to follow national
policy set by the Central Office located in Washington
DC. For this study we reviewed all large-scale adverse
events across the system and identified nine VA medical
facilities with these types of events since 2009 (Table 1).
The events were identified by the VA’s Office of
Public Health, who assisted in selecting nine events
that were timely and representative of the types of
events occurring in the healthcare organization. In
addition, representatives from the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) were part of our study Expert Panel
and lent their expertise to the event selection process.
The types of events varied from improper cleaning of
endoscopes to inadequate infection control processes
from a single provider to improper reuse of insulin
pens by nursing staff. The number of potentially
















Site 1 1104 2 – –
Site 2 6805 2 – –
Site 3 2531 3 12 6
Site 4 1812 2 10 8
Site 5 535 2 5 –
Site 6 982 2 1 –
Site 7 716 2 5 5
Site 8 286 2 5 8
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affected patients in the exposure group for each event
ranged from 168 to 6805.
Qualitative interviews
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews began with Network
Directors and other regional leaders, followed by Facility
Directors from each of the nine sites (see Fig. 1). These in-
terviews took place by phone and lasted 30 min (See Add-
itional file 1 for interview guides). Some Facility Directors
expressed concern about interviewing employees and pa-
tients at their sites. These adverse events were upsetting for
many staff and patients involved and some facilities felt that
interviews would be disruptive to those who were still in
the process of recovering from the event. As a result, we
did not interview employees and patients at all nine sites.
Employee interviews were conducted at six sites, followed
by interviews of Veterans/patients and their family mem-
bers at four sites. The four sites that participated in all
levels of interviews represented a variety of adverse events
impacting both small and large patient populations. Partici-
pants received a screening survey by email (employees) or
mail (patients) and indicated their willingness to participate.
Employee and patient interviews took place primarily in
person, with some phone interviews as needed. These inter-
views were 45–60 minutes in length and were recorded
after consent was obtained.
While conducting these interviews, we found that
there were many aspects of communication and
decision-making related to VA’s disclosure policy where
we needed additional information to fully understand
the implementation of the disclosure policy. Therefore,
we conducted additional phone and in-person interviews
with VA Central Office leadership in Washington, DC to
address these gaps. These, in turn, led us to adding
interviews with staff members representing elected offi-
cials who were part of the U.S. Congressional Veterans
Affairs committees, who are responsible for providing
oversight to the Department of Veterans Affairs, a role
analogous to a board of directors or trustees for other
private or public organizations.
Our interview guide was tailored for each role: leader,
employee, patient, family member, or Congressional staff
member. Interviews began with how the participant
learned about the large-scale adverse event and then
moved to questions about positives and negatives of the
communication, the implementation process, and the
lasting effects.
Conceptual framework
We used the Consolidated Framework for Implementa-
tion Research (CFIR) as a guide for identifying
constructs important to large-scale adverse event dis-
closure [12]. This approach has been applied to other
VA policy and program implementations, as well as in
non-VA settings [12, 13]. The CFIR covers a full
spectrum of dissemination and implementation elements
and can be used in diverse applications [14, 15]. The
CFIR describes five major domains, involving 26 subcon-
structs within these domains, which have the potential
for both serving as barriers or facilitators to any imple-
mentation: 1) characteristics of the intervention, 2) the
outer setting of an organization, 3) the inner setting, 4)
characteristics of individuals involved, and 5) the process
of implementation [14, 15]. These constructs were
derived from multi-disciplinary domains, including
psychology and organizational change [14].
Data analysis
Our analysis and reporting follow accepted guidelines
for qualitative research [16]. Following the interviews,
the team took field notes and the recorded interviews
were transcribed. Interview transcripts and notes were
first coded using a grounded thematic approach [17] and
the analysis of this data has been previously published
[18]. The coding team, consisting of three researchers
(EM, ARE, BB), identified many implementation themes
not previously reported in our prior publication. We
then recoded all interviews using the CFIR in a comple-
mentary analysis that showed new findings for health-
care leadership. The coding team met biweekly to
discuss application of the CFIR coding framework to the
interview data to ensure consistency. The CFIR allows
us to apply only the relevant subconstructs to our inter-
view data [12]. In each of the CFIR five domains there
are key constructs which made up our coding frame.
The team met regularly to resolve any discrepancies in
coding. From this review, we identified subconstructs
from the CFIR that were most prominent and were
related to positive or negative large-scale adverse event
disclosure policy implementation experiences.
Results
Seven CFIR subconstructs within three domains were
most prominent in interviews, either for positive or
negative influence on implementation. In the inner
Fig. 1 Description of the staged interview process
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setting domain: networks & communication and culture;
in the intervention characteristics domain: design of no-
tification & packaging, execution and costs; and in the
process domain: engaging external stakeholders and
reflecting & evaluating (Table 2).
Inner setting: networks & communication
Interviews with leaders and employees at all levels
included discussion of the impact, both positive and nega-
tive, of networks and communications on the implemen-
tation of the disclosure policy and resulting patient
notifications. One example was how employees found out
about the adverse event and patient communication
process. Small groups of frontline employees were in-
cluded early on to assist with the notification/disclosure
planning process. For most, this was their first experience
with the VA’s large-scale adverse event disclosure policy
and the resulting patient communication about this type
of event. These employees at times felt they were in a silo
and only received limited information. Employees who
were not part of these work groups found out about the
event much later. For some, they were made aware of the
event by media coverage instead of communication from
hospital leaders. Employees relied on informal communi-
cations channels when they did not receive formal com-
munications from leaders: “And there were a lot of
different stories. The communication was not clear. I think
everyone was uh, basically running for the hills so to speak
uh, and the people that did know about it wouldn’t really
communicate about it. The people that didn’t know about
it relied on rumors.”-Facility employee.
There were issues with communication identified that
related to the many levels of involvement required for a
large healthcare organization like the VA. When the pol-
icy is executed, there are many levels of review before
approval is given which can result in delays and issues
with communication. After facilities received official
word that a large-scale adverse event would need to be
communicated to patients, there were additional levels
of approval needed for the vetting of the communica-
tions plan and messages and execution of patient dis-
closure: “We had standing calls every day- with the
(regional network) at 4:30 and with (national leaders)
after that. We spent a lot of time waiting for approval.”
-Facility leadership.
Interviewees at all levels of the organization discussed
their frustrations with communication among the many
offices. Some suggested changes to the concurrence
process, like having the full group participate in an ini-
tial meeting to make decisions, in order to shorten the
review and approval time. Facilities also asked for more
independence in carrying out the implementation of the
patient communication and follow-up responses to
stakeholders.
Many discussed the need for the development of
formal communications with employees to share infor-
mation and clear up any misunderstandings: “Someone
always knows dirt and can always leak information so
you can’t control that. So you need to act quickly. Get the
message to each employee quickly so they know what to
say when they get approached. Arm them with the facts.”
-Facility leadership. In thinking about the future, a few
Table 2 Key CFIR Constructs and Illustrative Quotes
Domain Construct Interview Quote (s) Key Lessons Learned
Inner Setting Networks &
Communication
“It took weeks to wait on approval for the letters. It ended
up impacting the perception of hiding information.” –
Facility Director
Existing networks and communications patterns,
positive or negative, will impact the ability to organize
and disclosure in a timely way.
Culture “I think as far as what, clinically how we moved forward, I
think a lot of, um, what I’ve done next in my team is t-to
remind people to s-, ya know, speak up if you see some
thing that doesn’t seem quite right.” –Facility Director
Establish supportive culture focusing on open







“I liked getting the phone call because it kept me from
being shocked, like shocked about getting AIDS or
something. They reassured me, they said just come down
and we’ll check it out.” –Patient
Patients prefer phone call first.
Execution “I think we shoulda been told (the testing results) a lot
sooner that, that’s my only still, it’s not a complaint or a
blame game.” –Patient





“I would have involved stakeholders earlier. Give them a
heads up. You might not have all the answers but you can
say to them, this is what we know so far and we’ll follow
through. Give them lots of updates.” –Facility Leadership




“We’ve just bashed our head against the wall so many
times with this and it’s just silly that, you know, we, that
there isn’t a central clearing house of information - a set of,
you know, recommendations everyone can follow.”
-Facility employee
Hold formal evaluations and sharing of lessons
learned within the organization following a large-scale
disclosure.
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staff identified the communications techniques of a new
hospital Director as important. This leader sends weekly
emails to all staff with current information about hos-
pital events and information. Staff felt these open com-
munications would serve the facility well if they faced
another event in the future because they trusted that this
leader would communicate with them.
Inner setting: culture
Culture includes the norms and values of the healthcare
organization [14]. Many interviews included discussion
about disclosure policy given the low risk of the events
studied. For many, the open disclosure to patients
matched their desired culture of a “patient-first”
organization. They expressed pride in the intervention:
“I was honored to be part of this important work and get
a chance to do right by Veterans.” -Facility employee.
One facility experienced a lot of leadership transition
just before and during the implementation of the dis-
closure. As a result, the culture did not feel as certain
with new leaders in place and led to communication and
trust issues during disclosure. Others talked about how
strong leadership is important before an adverse event
occurs, and that leaders should be present and visible in
the facility: “And emails are sometimes overrated and
you know what we could do, what, you know what often
is, you know we have this um, this front line the, e- ex-
ecutive office say, ‘Let’s get out and make friends.’ They
need to know who medical center director is. And don’t
just show up when it’s a bad time.” -Facility employee.
Others discussed the potential impact the disclosure
policy and the experience of disclosure communications
during a large-scale adverse event could have on the cul-
tural values of improvement and future reporting of er-
rors. Due to negative experiences, especially with media
coverage, some leaders felt they needed to make sure
that employees knew the importance of disclosure and
were encouraged to report future errors: “I think as far
as what, clinically how we moved forward, I think a lot
of, um, what I’ve done next in my team is t-to remind
people to s-, ya know, speak up if you see something that
doesn’t seem quite right.” -Facility employee.
Intervention characteristics: design of notification &
packaging
Design and packaging refers to the presentation of the
intervention and how accessible it is to users [14]. If the
design and packaging is poor or perceived as poor, then
it may be less likely to be used and may limit success.
While the national disclosure policy outlines the types of
events that must be communicated with patients and
basic components of communication, it does not pre-
scribe in detail how these communications must occur.
Facilities work with national VA leadership to design a
communications plan that the facility is responsible for
executing. Some aspects of the plan receive more sup-
port from higher leadership, for example follow up with
media and Congressional officials may be performed by
local, regional or national public affairs staff. Many of
the VA leaders and employees described a large volume
of work that went into the planning for these patient
communications without detailed guidance on best
practices.
Patients provided feedback on the design of the inter-
vention (the patient notification and testing clinics). The
sites interviewed primarily notified patients using a certi-
fied, U.S. mail letter. Patients were invited to attend a
special evaluation clinic for testing and a toll-free tele-
phone hotline was available for questions to ensure both
answers were accessible and uniform in message. Certi-
fied letters were used to communicate the adverse event,
but the majority of patients interviewed were not satis-
fied with receiving a certified letter. Most preferred
phone contact first, followed by a letter sent by regular
mail. In addition, staff and patients asked for more infor-
mation to be included in the letters/first contact. Pa-
tients wanted details about the event that could help
them understand risk, and many frontline staff sup-
ported that: “The contact was really confusing for patients.
They weren’t given specifics and these gentlemen were
people who could have understood specifics. One had no
clue as to the extent of his risk.” -Facility employee.
Patients and employees felt that those staffing the tele-
phone hotline should be provided detailed information in
order to be able to adequately answer questions. Many
discussed the type/position of employee who should be
making contact with patients. Preference was for em-
ployees with strong communications skills to make these
first contacts, such as social workers or nurses.
Evaluation clinic design varied for each of the sites. All
sites had dedicated space and staff for these special clinics.
Some sites included an individual or group presentation
first where hospital leadership presented patients with
information about the event and showed the medical in-
struments that were used, if applicable. This gave patients
the opportunity to ask questions before being tested.
Some facilities also included opportunities for patients to
meet with counselors, nurses, or chaplains one-on-one if
they had additional questions or needed support. Several
staff and leadership identified the need to have high-level
leadership present in the testing clinics. These leaders
made themselves available to meet with patients who were
very angry or upset. Leadership presence was also import-
ant so that front-line staff felt supported. When leadership
was absent, staff noted this as an issue: “I didn’t see leader-
ship in the clinic at all. I think (the Director) should have
been down there and should have been making apologies
to Veterans.” -Facility employee.
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Intervention characteristics: execution
Tied in with the design of the notification, execution
was also important. Timing was a key issue in execution.
Many of the patients were not notified before the story
was presented by the media, which was often thought to
be due to a leak of the incident details rather than a
planned press release. As a result, many patients saw
news stories before they received notification letters. At
some sites, there were multiple rounds of notifications
due to patients inadvertently missed during initial
reviews or expansion of the exposure cohort due to new
information about the event or updated analyses. In-
ternal communication was closely tied to execution.
There were communications and approval delays at high
levels of leadership that impacted the speed of the re-
sponse: “Facility staff knew what was happening from the
media coverage but it took us a little longer to have
internal communications ready, to get those approved by
(central office). This is part of the central issue with com-
munications.” -Facility leadership. Coordination was es-
sential for success in execution: “When these things
happen, you need consistent, confined, uniform, and tar-
geted response.” -Regional leadership.
The execution of the testing clinics was a positive aspect
of notification. Staff were often able to arrange for tem-
porary testing clinics quickly: “We prepared this in only
5 days. We had to prepare reception in the lobby. Write
scripts. Set up computers with privacy walls. Created a
family support center. Completely moved primary care
and turned it into a special care clinic.” -Facility leader-
ship. Facilities were able to test large numbers of patients,
while providing optional counseling services. The speed of
receiving testing results, however, was noted as an area
that could be improved. Patients expressed that a 2-week
waiting period for testing results led to increased anxiety.
A larger theme in timing of notifications emerged here.
There were many stakeholder groups: patients, employees,
advocacy groups, media, elected officials. Hospitals strug-
gled with executing these notifications in a timely way.
Employees, advocacy groups and elected officials must be
notified in order to support the patients. However, notify-
ing these groups before contacting patients can sometimes
lead to media leaks. Hospitals all struggled with the timing
of notifications but all recognized the importance of mov-
ing quickly to provide information to all of these stake-
holders, and especially to patients. “I would have involved
stakeholders earlier. Give them a heads up. You might not
have all the answers but you can say to them, this is what
we know so far and we’ll follow through. Give them lots of
updates.” -Facility leadership.
Process: engaging external stakeholders
Interview participants discussed elected officials, patient
advocacy groups called Veteran Service Organizations
(VSOs), and the media as external stakeholders. Stake-
holders were engaged differently in the events studied
which led to many lessons learned. VSOs are advocacy
groups with extensive contact with patients and their
families. VSO leadership were often quoted in media
reports and VSOs frequently released their own state-
ments on websites and social media. Some facilities
alerted VSOs ahead of public releases about the event.
Members of leadership at one facility gave in-person and
telephone presentations to VSOs which were felt to be
particularly helpful. These meetings gave leaders a
chance to show VSOs the medical equipment that was
involved in the event, demonstrate how the error
occurred, and spend extensive time answering questions.
VSOs can communicate information about testing and
follow up to patients. Facilities that spent more time
informing these stakeholders felt they benefited from the
process: “Before the press conference, we scheduled meet-
ings with VSOs and congressional offices. We had a
conference call for those who couldn’t join the in person
meeting. I gave a full briefing and gave them firsthand
information. We gave the bullet points on a handout. It
was very helpful, more open. We had the right people at
the table to answer their questions. There was no time
limit for the meeting; I wanted to be sure they had all
the info they needed.” –Facility leadership.
Many interviewed talked about the importance of rela-
tionships with the media. Leaders and employees often
reflected that relationships should be developed before
an event occurs. This existing relationship can be benefi-
cial in trying to make sure key information about the
organization’s response is covered by reporters: “The first
lesson, it’s one I’ve believed in, every facility should
develop strong relationships with the media well before
the stuff hits the fan. Provide opportunity for the media
to be invited to the medical center, offer them stories,
these types of actions would preclude the media jumping
on a “gotcha” type story. If they knew you, they wouldn’t
put out these types of stories.” –Regional leader Inter-
viewees noted that the existing relationships can be hurt,
however, when the facility does not respond quickly to
media questions during an event.
Elected officials are another group that looks for
detailed and timely information from VA regarding these
events. Many facilities discussed delays in informing
both local and national elected officials, which they
perceived resulted in negative attention from these
stakeholders, including negative comments in media
stories. Many asked for elected officials to be informed
early and continuously updated as the disclosure process
unfolded. The delays in receiving approval for communi-
cation were often at higher levels of the VA, which
involved long reviews of communication processes and a
lack of consensus about how early to notify elected
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officials. Leaders struggled between notifying them early
when information about the event was incomplete, or
notifying them later with more complete information
but much closer to the public notification period.
Process: reflecting & evaluating
Reflecting and evaluating involves opportunities to pro-
vide feedback about the implementation and allows for
debriefing [14]. Leaders and employees discussed their
desire to share their experiences with others in the
healthcare organization. Many talked about the disclos-
ure policy and the start of the communication planning
process. At that time, they looked for feedback from fa-
cilities that had conducted large-scale disclosures in the
past. They reached out to staff at these facilities and
asked them to share their best practices and lessons
learned. “Ask… who else has been through this and con-
tact those sites. It is a huge undertaking and you don’t
have to reinvent the wheel.” -Facility employee. After the
event, they wanted to formalize their own lessons
learned for leadership and for facilities that would go
through the process in the future. Many asked for a for-
mal post process, expressing a desire to share their ex-
perience and tools they had developed with other
facilities. “Most facilities haven’t done anything like this
before and they need the support.” -National leadership.
Intervention characteristics: costs
Costs of the intervention and implementation can take
different forms, and exclude money, time, etc. in the
CFIR analysis [14]. Overall, there were gains and losses
following a large-scale adverse event. Many of the costs
greatly impacted the facility and the VA as a whole, in-
cluding significant impact on employee morale, damage
to reputation, and loss of patient trust. Despite the costs,
some interviewees were able to discuss the positives, in-
cluding team building and improvements to the facility.
Some employees feared job loss and discipline during
events: “I saw a news report that the director lost his job.
Monday morning, it was like a 100 % change. People
throughout felt they could be out at any time.” -Faclity
employee. Leaders in particular felt they may be re-
moved from their positions as a result of the event. In
three facilities, leadership did change during and after
event disclosure. The removal of leaders impacted the
perception of job insecurity for other employees as well.
It is important to note, however, that in cases where one
provider was knowingly using unsafe practices, discipline
and job loss was supported by interviewees.
Leaders, employees, and patients all discussed one of
the greatest costs of disclosure of these events: trust in
the healthcare organization. Trust was impacted nega-
tively by delays in discovering issues and then in notify-
ing patients. Further delays in obtaining testing results,
use of letters instead of one-to-one contact, extensive
negative media coverage, lack of detail about what hap-
pened and how organization is following up on issues
further impacted trust and reputation.
Some patients interviewed, however, felt the disclo-
sures of these adverse events increased trust in the
organization: “It actually made me feel better. They
caught the mistake and improved. Everything is improved
now. The clinic is cleaner. Everything is in top condition.
I applaud them.” –Patient.
These patients were pleased that the VA let them
know about the event, even if it caused them significant
distress. Many patients talked about learning more about
the event and how the detail helped them to feel more
confident that they had not been harmed and increased
their trust. Some patients had negative past experiences
with the organization and already had a low sense of
trust. In those cases, the event served to confirm their
lack of trust. Others who had more positive past experi-
ences and higher trust in the organization were more
trusting of efforts to disclose.
Discussion
The Institute of Medicine’s To Err is Human called for
dialogue and reporting of adverse events and efforts to-
ward prevention of errors and improved safety culture
[18]. This report stresses the difficulty but necessity of
developing comprehensive approaches to patient safety.
Individual disciplines, anesthesiology for example, have
worked on identifying events and communicating with
patients [19]. The call for open communication, both
within the profession or the healthcare organization and
with patients, about adverse events has long been sup-
port by the literature and individual disciplines [18, 19].
This literature often discusses the difficulty but import-
ance of open communication following an adverse event.
Although several organizations have released guidelines
or policies for disclosure [20–22], the full impact on
actual disclosure is unclear [23]. Much of this work has
not differentiated between clinical adverse events and
large-scale adverse events. Our work evaluating the im-
plementation of a health care organization’s disclosure
policy reveals many important gaps and successes. In
addition, our focus on large-scale events identifies com-
plex issues related to communicating with many patients
in a short timeframe. How organizations respond to
large-scale adverse events represents a type of stress test
for the organizational culture. In a large healthcare
organization like the VA, one large-scale adverse event
affects not just one hospital but the whole system.
We found that existing networks and communications
patterns become critical during large-scale disclosure
when many groups need to be given key information
quickly, including leaders and employees who will be
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implementing the policy and communicating with pa-
tients. If the existing communication channels are
strong, the facility will be better equipped to carry out
disclosures in a timely way. If there are communications
issues prior to disclosure, this can negatively impact the
outcomes of the implementation process. Strong com-
munication networks are particularly important in a na-
tional system where an issue at one hospital can
potentially affect the entire system.
The lasting impact of disclosure of large-scale adverse
events can be damaging. We found that interviewees
saw the costs of disclosure as loss of trust, and em-
ployees worried about job security. The VA disclosure
policy was designed to promote transparency with
patients regarding their healthcare; however, implemen-
tation issues can hinder this goal. This loss of trust may
occur if patients do not receive a personal first contact
and stakeholders are not informed in a timely way.
When a facility delays responses or provides no response
to media inquiries, this affects the perceived transpar-
ency of the organization. Providing timely responses
with as much detail as possible may help maintain stake-
holder relationships and improve quality of reporting.
Many Veterans felt it was important that they were in-
formed about the event, and they talked about how noti-
fication improved their trust in the VA. However, timing
can be a major issue in a large organization with many
layers. Leaders must set the tone, prioritize the response,
and minimize the layers of approval in order to allow
things to progress quickly.
The current VA large-scale disclosure policy is focused
on ethics, not implementation. In support of existing re-
search, we found that the design of the disclosure com-
munication is critically important [1, 4]. Patients desired
timely, personalized communication. However the
process for doing this had not been outlined in the pol-
icy in detail sufficient to allow rapid implementation,
and led to much planning work on behalf of the facil-
ities. Patients stated that they preferred a disclosure
process involving a personal phone contact from some-
one prepared to answer their questions. Letters, espe-
cially certified letters, were not viewed as a positive first
contact for this patient group. Patients indicated that the
speed and accuracy with which disclosure was imple-
mented was also very important. Delays in the process
were of great concern to them, and to other stake-
holders, such as family members, and congressional
staff.
Many facilities discussed the importance of existing
organizational culture impacting the disclosure process.
We found that a focus on the patient first in the existing
culture helped this process. However, some leaders were
concerned that their organization’s negative experiences
with disclosure, as perceived by its employees and
patients, may also lead to an organizational culture less
inclined to effectively implement the disclosure policy. If
the organization’s leadership does not emphasize the im-
portance of disclosure and safety after a difficult disclos-
ure process, the result could be hesitancy for employees
to report similar large-scale adverse events affecting pa-
tients to their organization’s leadership in the future,
thus leading to less transparency and follow-up of poten-
tial consequences to patients from the adverse event
itself. Evaluating culture prior to any LSAEs may poten-
tially be important in identifying problem areas and
assessing organizational climate and safety. In future re-
search, we plan to study employee survey data through-
out the healthcare system to determine if there is a
relationship between organizational climate and safety
and the potential for a large-scale adverse event. Our
goal is to identify large-scale adverse events prior to
occurrence, using organizational climate and safety re-
ports as a potential indicator of these events. Application
of these indicators may lead to a focus on improving
healthcare organization climate and safety and thus pre-
vention of large-scale adverse events.
We experienced some limitations in studying the im-
plementation of this large-scale disclosure policy. The
VA has many levels of organizational structure involved
in the implementation of this national policy which
might not be the case in all healthcare organizations. It
may be possible for smaller organizations to move more
rapidly in approving patient disclosures and responding
to stakeholder inquiries. The VA may also have some
benefits in this process due to size. The organization is
well equipped to test many patients for blood borne
pathogen infections resulting from the large-scale ad-
verse event in a short amount of time, when needed to
assess for disease risk following an event. Additionally,
we were only able to study nine past large-scale adverse
events within this integrated healthcare system. To fur-
ther our work in this area, we plan to develop a toolkit
and a technical assistance program to assist healthcare
facilities with implementing large-scale disclosures
across the healthcare system, and study the impact of
this toolkit on future implementation of this policy.
Conclusions
Disclosure is an essential part of quality healthcare [2].
This study contributes to the literature on disclosures of
large-scale adverse events by providing guidance on the
additional elements of disclosure implementation needed
to assist organizations in carrying out timely and coordi-
nated disclosures to patients. The lessons learned from
the experiences of the facilities in our study can help
healthcare organizations of varying sizes implement their
disclosure policies and provide timely communications
to patients and other stakeholders in the future. All
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healthcare organizations may benefit from our finding
about the importance of evaluating culture and commu-
nications prior to an adverse event and making improve-
ments so that the disclosure implementation process
will move smoothly when needed. Understanding patient
preferences for communication (i.e. phone call first) can
help any organization design effective disclosures.
Employees and patients in this study were eager to share
their experiences and insights for the design of disclo-
sures to patients in the future. The VA has already acted
on some of these lessons and continues to seek out im-
provements to the process [24]. Our prior work has
shown that the design of disclosure communication may
impact the ways in which the media represent the events
[25]. Adverse events may also affect healthcare
utilization [26]. Subsequently, attending to the ways in
which the disclosure policy is carried out is critical. Our
analysis reveals key constructs that one should attend to
in order to optimize the disclosure communication.
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